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ABSTRACT
The paper proposes a new approach for evaluating the secu-
rity levels of digital watermarking schemes, which is more in
line with the formulation proposed in cryptography. We first
exhibit the class of equivalent decoding keys. These are the
keys allowing a reliable decoding of contents watermarked
with the secret key. Then, we evaluate the probability that the
adversary picks an equivalent key. The smaller this probabil-
ity, the higher the key length. This concept is illustrated on
two main families of watermarking schemes: DC-QIM (Dis-
tortion Compensation Quantization Index Modulation) and
SS (Spread Spectrum). The trade-off robustness-security is
again verified and gives some counter-intuitive results: For
instance, the security of SS is a decreasing function of the
length of the secret vector at a fixed Document to Watermark
power ratio. Additionally, under the Known Message Attack,
the practical key length of the watermarking scheme rapidly
decreases to 0 bits per symbol.
Index Terms— Watermarking , Security , Key Length ,
Quantization , Spread-spectrum
1. INTRODUCTION
The concept of security in watermarking has not a so long
history compared to cryptography. The early works base wa-
termarking security assessment on the information about the
secret key that leaks from the observations [1, 2]. This is
the translation of the definition of security for cryptosystems
by C.E. Shannon. However, this conception rarely applies in
modern cryptography which almost always relies on compu-
tational security1.
Another difference comes from the fact that the secret
keys may not be unique in watermarking. In cryptography,
the exact knowledge of the secret key is needed to decrypt
cipher texts or to encrypt messages. In watermarking, the se-
cret key is usually a real vector: it is for example the dither of
This work was partly founded by the French National Research Agency
program referenced ANR-10-CORD-019 under the Estampille project.
1It is also true that we witness a recent trend to a return to information
theoretical security in cryptography.
DC-QIM (Distortion Compensated Quantization Index Mod-
ulation) or the carrier of SS (Spread Spectrum) schemes. The
embedder and the decoder generates this secret vector using
the same seed of a pseudo-random generator but the adversary
needs not to find back this seed. Indeed it is usually easier to
find an estimation of the secret vector good enough to grant
the decoding of watermarked contents or the embedding of
hidden messages in content. Therefore, we consider that the
secret key, denoted by k (or k for vectors) in the sequel, is the
secret vector, not the seed. This idea has been first sketched
in [3] and this paper investigates it thoroughly.
In cryptography the security of a primitive strongly re-
lies on the size of the secret key. If the implementation of
the scheme is not flawed by some security pitfalls, the ad-
versary has no other option than performing an exhaustive
search. This attack scans all the possible keys in order to
find the one used for encryption. The size N of the crypto-
graphic key in bits is consequently directly linked with the
number of trials necessary to perform this exhaustive search
attack (a.k.a. brute-force attack). If the key is a uniformly
drawn binary word of length N , the probability to pick the
right key is p = 2−N , the size of the key ensemble is p−1 = 2N
or in logarithmic scale − log2(p) = N bits.
In this paper, we would like to measure watermarking se-
curity in the same manner. To do so, we will ask the following
question: What is the probability p that the adversary picks up
a convenient key? Then, the security level of the scheme will
be called the key length measured by − log2(p) in bits.
2. INFORMATION THEORETIC SECURITY
Let us denote K the random variable associated to the secret
key, K the space of the secret keys. Before producing any
watermarked content, the designer draws the secret key k
according to a given distribution pK(K = k). The adversary
knows K and pK(K = k) but he doesn’t know the instan-
tiation k. This lack of knowledge can be measured in bits
by the entropy of the key H(K) ≜ − ⨋K pK(k) log2 pK(k)
(i.e., an integral if K is a continuous r.v. or a sum if K
is a discrete r.v.). Now, suppose the adversary sees No
observations ONo = (O1, . . . ,ONo). The nature of these
observations defines the attack. In this paper, we restrict
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our attention to the Known Message Attack (KMA - an
observation is a pair of a watermarked content and the em-
bedded message). Thanks to these observations, the ad-
versary can refine his knowledge about the key by con-
structing a posteriori distribution pK(k∣ONo). The infor-
mation leakage is given in bits by the mutual information
I(K;ONo), and the equivocation he(No) ≜ H(K ∣ONo)
measures how this leakage decreases the initial lack of infor-
mation: he(No) = H(K) − I(K;ONo). The equivocation
is a non increasing function. For most of the watermarking
schemes, the information leakage is not null, and as the ad-
versary keeps on observing, the equivocation decreases down
to 0 (discrete r.v.) or −∞ (continuous r.v.). This means that
the adversary as collected enough observations so that he can
uniquely identify the secret key k.
The subsections below show a geometrical interpretation
of the concept for two watermarking schemes. Thanks to
the observations (e.g. watermarked vectors y1, . . . ,yNo in
Fig. 2), the adversary succeeds to restrict the set of possible
keys to a smaller set K(ONo) ⊂ K depicted in Fig. 1.
2.1. DC-QIM
Let us model the host signal by a vector x ∈ RNv . Consider
a lattice Λ ⊂ RNv . For each message m ∈ {1,2, . . . ,M}, a
coset leader dm is defined such that ∪Mm=1Λ + dm is a finer
lattice. Hiding message m in x yields watermarked vector y:
y = e(x,m,k) = x+α(QΛ(x−dm −k)−x+dm +k), (1)
with QΛ(.) the Euclidean quantizer on Λ. The key k is a Nv
dimension vector applying a secret shift of the quantizer. Due
to the Λ-periodicity, the key ensemble K is the Voronoi cellV(Λ) ≜ {v ∈ RNv ∣QΛ(v) = 0}.
Paper [4] shows that the security is maximized if k
has been uniformly drawn over K = V(Λ), and that, un-
der the KMA attack, the adversary succeeds to narrow
the key ensemble down to K(ONo) = ∩Noi=1Di with Di ≜
y˜i − dmi − (1 − α)V(Λ) and y˜ ≜ y − QΛ(y). The equivo-
cation is then the expectation of the log-volume of this set:
he(No) = E[log(vol(KNo))]. K(ONo) is in general hard to
compute and [4] gives fast approximations.
2.2. Spread Spectrum
Consider a spread spectrum one-bit watermarking s.t. y =
e(x,m,k) = x+(−1)mk, withm ∈ {−1,1}. The host is mod-
eled by a white Gaussian vector of power σ2X andNv samples.
The secret key is usually drawn also as K ∼ N (0, σ2KINv).
This time, K = RNv is not bounded. Yet, thanks to the
AEP, for Nv sufficiently large, the key indeed lies in a
bounded volume so-called the typical set with high proba-
bility: P[k ∈ K] > 1 −  with vol(K) ≤ 2H(K)+n. In this
very simple case, K = {v ∈ RNv ∶ ∣ ∥v∥2Nvσ2K − 1∣ < 2} and
H(K) = Nv/2. log2(2pieσ2K). Under the KMA, he(No) =
Nv/2. log2(2pie σ2Xσ2Kσ2
X
+Noσ2K ), and the estimation Kˆ is given
in [5, Eq.(3) (4)]. Again, thanks to the AEP, he(No) can be
seen as the log volume of the typical set of the estimation Kˆ.
3. PROBABILISTIC WATERMARKING SECURITY
Our new definition of the security is not centered on the infor-
mation leakage or estimation of a key. It is based on the fact
that the secret key may not be unique in digital watermarking
because there exist equivalent keys.
From key k, a watermarking scheme derives an encoder
y = e(x,m, k) and a decoder mˆ = d(y, k) which can be
thought as regions in the embedding domain. The decoding
region is defined as Dm(k) ≜ {y ∈ RNv ∶ d(y, k) = m}. To
hide message m, the encoder pushes the host vector x deep
inside Dm(k), and this creates an embedding region Em(k).
To provide robustness, Em(k) ⊂ Dm(k) s.t. if the vector ex-
tracted from an attacked content z = y+n goes out of Em(k),
zmight be still inDm(k) and the correct message is decoded.
We introduce the set of equivalent decoding keysK(d)eq (k, )
as the set of keys that allow a decoding of the hidden mes-
sages embedded with k with probability 1 − :
K(d)eq (k, ) = {k′ ∈ K ∶ P[d(e(x,m, k), k′) ≠m] ≤ } (2)
In the same way, K(e)eq (k, ) is the set of keys that allow to
embed messages which will be reliably decoded using key k.
In Fig. 2, k′ ∈ K(d)eq (k,0) because Em(k) ⊂ Dm(k′), whereas
k′ ∉ K(e)eq (k,0) because Em(k′) ⊄ Dm(k). This paper only
focuses on the equivalent decoding keys. The goal of the ad-
versary is now to draw a key according to the set of observa-
tions Keq(ONo) which also belongs to Keq (see Fig.1).
The issue is then the probability P (d)() (or P (e)())
that an adversary picks up an equivalent key. For instance,
if the keys are uniformly distributed over a bounded set,
P (d)() = E[vol(K(d)eq (k, ))]/vol(K) (see Fig. 1). Like in
Sect. 2, we also would like to investigate how the observations
ONo increases this probability. Again, if the estimator of k
is uniformly distributed over K(ONo), then P (d)(,No) =
E[vol(K(d)eq (k, ) ∩ K(ONo))/vol(K(ONo)))]. Finally, the
security level is then expressed in bits as the key length:
L(,No) ≜ − log2(P (d)(,No)) bits, (3)
to obtain an analogy with cryptography.
The next sections of this paper compute the key length of
two classical watermarking schemes: DC-QIM with a cubic
lattice (a.k.a. SCS) and Spread Spectrum.
4. INVESTIGATIONS ON DC-QIM
From now on, we suppose that Λ is a cubic lattice. We can
then proceed component-wise and we introduce pi(d)(,No)
and `(,No) the probability and key length per symbol, a
symbol in {1,2, . . . ,M} being embedded per component. For
a given component, the secret key is a scalar k, and regionsEm(k) and Dm(k) are two intervals of respective lengths(1−α)∆ and ∆/M both centered on k+m∆/M . We assume
that the message is embedded without error (α > (M −1)/M )
and that the adversary wants to decode without error ( = 0).
The secret key is uniformly drawn over the interval K =[−∆/2,∆/2] s.t. the information theoretical approach eval-
uates the security to H(K) = log2 ∆ bits. Depending on
the value of ∆, this quantity can be negative whose inter-
pretability is difficult. On the contrary, the computation of
the key length is straightforward. As illustrated in Fig. 3,
we have K(d)eq (k,0) = [k′min, k′max] and vol(K(d)eq (k,0)) =
∆(α − 1 + 1/M). This yields the key length per symbol:
`(0,0) = − log2(α + 1/M − 1) bits. (4)
Note that the probabilistic approach yields a key length in-
dependent of ∆ contrary to the information theoretical ap-
proach, and `(0,0) → ∞ for α → (M − 1)/M . This means
that only k′ = k allows a decoding without errors becauseEm(k) = Dm(k), ∀m. On the other hand, if α = 1 (no distor-
tion compensation), pi(d)(,No) =M−1. All samples with m
embedded inside are decoded as m′ and there is one chance
out of M that m′ =m.
For No = 1 in the KMA setup, the information theoretical
approach evaluates the security to he(1) = log2((1 − α)∆)
bits [5, Eq.(16)]. K(ONo) is defined by the feasible regionD1 (see Sub. 2.1), which is in this case the interval of length(1 − α)∆ centered on y1 +m∆/M . Depending of the value
Dm(k) k + dm + `∆
∆/MEm(k) (1 − α)∆Dm(k′min) k′min + dm + `∆
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Fig. 3. Computation of vol(K(d)eq (k,0)) for DC-QIM.
of y1, we can compute the probability that a key belonging
to the feasible set is included in the equivalent set, and its
expectation enables to compute pi(d)(0,1). Finally the key
length is:
`(0,1) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩− log2
(α+(1−M)/M)(5−5α−1/M)
4(1−α)2 bits if α ≤ α′
0 bit if α > α′,
where α′ is the root of equation (α + (1 −M)/M)(5 − 5α −
1/M) = 4(1 − α)2, α′ ∈ [0,1]. The feasible set is always
included in the equivalent region for α > α′.
For No > 1, we must use Monte-Carlo simulations. For
a given run, we draw a key k, we generate No observations
and compute K(ONo), which is also an interval in this case,
and its intersection with K(d)eq (k,0). This gives us the proba-
bility pi(d)(0,No) (see Sect. 3). We finally take the log of the
average of pi(d)(0,No) over Nr runs.
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Fig. 4. key length per symbol for DC-QIM and M = 2 vs. the
distortion compensation parameter α.
Fig. 4 gives the key length per symbol. Parameter α is
usually increased to gain some robustness, whereas the key
length is a decreasing function. This illustrates the trade-off
robustness-security. The probability to disclose the secret key
over Ns symbol is pi(d)(,No)Ns . Therefore, the total key
length is L(,No) = Ns`(,No). Note that the key length
in bits might be bigger than the vector dimension Ns be-
cause `(,No) can be bigger than 1 bit. This is due to the
fact than the key is not a binary word but a vector in RNv .
Also, L(,No) should be clipped to the length of the binary
seed of the PRNG. We conjecture that, in KMA, for a given
α ∈ ((M − 1)/M,1], there exists a N⋆o s.t. No ≥ N⋆o sets
in expectation `(0,No) = 0, i.e. the scheme is totally broken
whatever the length Ns.
5. INVESTIGATIONS ON SPREAD SPECTRUM
We consider the simple case of a one-bit embedding with
x ∼ N (0, σ2XI) and y = x + (−1)mk, where m ∈ {0,1}. The
decoder is correlation based: d(y,k) = 0 if y⊺k > 0, 1 else.
When a noise is added giving z = y+n with n ∼ N (0, σ2NI),
the Bit Error Rate equals Φ (−∥k∥/√σ2N + σ2X) (Φ(.) the cu-
mulative distribution function of a normal r.v.). Even without
noise, the BER is not null and we define η ≜ Φ(−∥k∥/σX).
Now, the adversary draws a key k′ and decoding a
content watermarked with k yields d(y,k′) = 0 if x⊺k′ +(−1)mk⊺k′ > 0. Therefore, the BER is Φ (−k⊺k′/σX∥k′∥),
which is lower than  if
k⊺k′∥k′∥∥k∥ ≥ τ(,k) ≜ − σX∥k∥Φ−1() = Φ−1()Φ−1(η) . (5)
The LHS is the cosine of the angle between k and k′ which
is always lower than 1. Thus, there exist equivalent keys iff
 > η. Keq(,k) is then a single hypercone of axis k and
angle arccos(Φ−1()/Φ−1(η)).
For No = 0, the probability of drawing a key k′ ∼N (0, σ2KINv) inside Keq(,k) is the ratio of the solid angle
of this hypercone and the full space. This equals β(,k) ≜(1−Iτ(,k)2(1/2, (Nv−1)/2))/2 where I(.) is the regularized
incomplete beta function. Finally, pi(d)(,0) = E[β(,k)],
where the expectation is over pK(K = k).
For No > 0, we suppose without loss of generality that
the embedded messages were all set to 0. Then one estima-
tor kˆ is the average of the watermarked contents, e.g. kˆ =
N−1o ∑Noi=1 xi + k and p(kˆ∣ONo) is N (k,N−1o σ2XINv). The
probability of drawing an estimation inside Keq(,k) is up-
per bounded by the cumulative distribution function of a non-
central F-distribution variable of degrees of freedom ν1 = 1,
ν2 = Nv − 1 and non centrality parameter λ(k) = No ∥k∥2σ2
X
,
weighted by the probability P[k′⊺k > 0]:
γ(,No,k) ≜ [1 − F ((Nv − 1)τ(,k)2
1 − τ(,k)2 ;ν1, ν2, λ(k))]∗ Φ (√λ(k)) (6)
Finally, pi(d)(,No) ≲ E[γ(,No,k)], where the expectation
is over pK(K = k).
Fig. 5 plots the key lengths for three different setups (No =
0, No = 1 and No = 10) and DWR = 10dB. The most impor-
tant fact is that the key length is a decreasing function w.r.t.
Nv , the length of k. This seems counter-intuitive and contra-
dicts a claim of [3] (a key length proportional to Nv). This is
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Fig. 5. key length per symbol for SS: DWR = 10dB,
 = 10−2, ⋆ represents Monte-Carlo simulations using 103
random keys and observing 102 times No contents.
indeed normal since it stems from the trade-off robustness vs.
security: a bigger Nv improves the robustness but decreases
the key length. We also note the devastating effect of KMA:
forNv = 200 the key length decreases from approximately 50
bits to 10 bits for No = 1 and 10−3 bits for No = 10. Some
key lengths were estimated by Monte-Carlo simulations when
possible (ie. not too big) and they confirm the theoretical val-
ues. Again, these are key lengths per symbol and shall be
multiplied by Ns for a multi-bit SS scheme.
6. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
This novel definition of the security in watermarking enables
to compute the security of a scheme regarding an exhaus-
tive search strategy. It also enables to compute and analyse
a watermarking scheme the same way as one would quantify
the security of a cryptographic system. Yet this first analysis
shows that the key length, which can be very important when
the adversary doesn’t have access to any observations; can
also decrease dramaticaly whenever the adversary can uses
observations.
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